Abstract
Introduction
In the run-up to the next phase of negotiations on agricultural trade reform in the WTO, many countries have raised the issue of state trading as a negotiating item in their recent submissions. For example, the United States (probably the most vociferous critic of state trading) has proposed in its submission 'to end exclusive export (import) rights and to ensure private sector competition in markets controlled by single desk exporters (importers) ' (WTO, 2000a) . The Mercosur countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) have proposed in their submission to the WTO that 'members agree to discipline the activities of governmental and non-governmental enterprises and marketing boards which benefit from monopoly import/export rights, with a view to avoiding distorting effects on the market' (WTO, 2001a) . The EU has also taken a stance on this issue. Even though the EU does not use state trading enterprises to manage its agricultural trade it has, as is well-known, come under criticism for its widespread use of export subsidies. The EU appears to have linked further negotiations on export subsidies with the state trading issue in submitting that 'on the condition that all forms of export subsidisation are treated on an equal footing, the EC stand ready to negotiate further reduction in export subsidies ' (WTO, 2000b) . Other countries that have made reference to the state trading issue include agricultural importing countries which have been traditional users of state trading enterprises. However, unlike the export competing countries listed above that have been fairly specific regarding their concerns with state trading, Japan and Korea have been considerably more vague with reference to increasing the 'transparency and predictability' as suggested by Japan (WTO, 2000c) ; and with Korea putting more onus on the exporting countries that use state trading enterprises, noting that state trading should not be used to allow countries 'circumventing reduction commitment in export supply' (WTO, 2001b) .
The common theme with these submissions is that many countries see the existence of state trading enterprises as a potential distortion to trade. From the export side, countries that manage exports through state trading enterprises are therefore deemed to have some advantages that would not be available to the private sector. From the import side, the use of state trading enterprises would appear to limit market access. Taken together, the concern is clearly that even if increasing market access into importing country markets could be secured, the level of market access and the gains from trade reform would be limited by the existence of state trading enterprises. From the export side, even if more obvious aspects of 'unfair' export competition in the form of export subsidies could be negotiated, concern would still remain with the suspected advantages available through the use of state trading enterprises. Taken together, if these suspicions are correct, it would appear that state trading is a legitimate issue to be dealt with in the forthcoming negotiations on agricultural trade.
There are two further points to raise to put the current focus on state trading into a wider context. First, it should be noted that state trading is not a 'new' issue for the GATT/WTO. Ever since the initial 1947 Agreement, state trading has been part of the GATT architecture with a recognition that state trading may be widely used and that rules should exist to influence their behaviour. The fact that state trading has now been raised as a negotiating issue probably reflects two aspects of its current status in the WTO. First, in terms of trade in goods, the highest incidence of state trading occurs in agriculture. The fact that until the Uruguay Round, agriculture was largely outside the GATT framework suggests that there would be little return in challenging the practices of state trading enterprises in a sector where government intervention was so pervasive. Indeed, until very recently, there has been no challenge to the practices of state trading enterprises through the GATT disputes settlement process. Second, now that agriculture is now more obviously part of the WTO framework, this means that wider disciplines should apply to the agricultural sector. The current emphasis on state trading therefore may represent a general dissatisfaction with GATT rules on state trading as being inadequate both in recognising the pervasiveness and practices of state trading enterprises and on the rules that discipline their behaviour.
The second point to be made relating to the wider context of state trading relates not to current members and how state trading may distort trade, but to potential new members of the WTO. Of particular interest here is China, a country that widely uses state trading to manage its agricultural exports and imports (as well as trade in other sectors). The use of state trading was a key part of China's negotiations to accede to the WTO. With many other transition economies likely to accede to the WTO sometime in the future, countries that have used and continue to use state trading enterprises to manage trade, there is an incentive to make the rules on the existence and practices of state trading enterprises clearer for both current and prospective members alike.
The aim of this paper is two-fold. First, we review current GATT rules on state trading enterprises and how the current WTO framework deals with making the practices of state trading transparent. We also consider the immediate concerns with state trading enterprises and Uruguay Round commitments arising from the Agreement on Agriculture. In the second part of the paper, we survey the results of recent research we have been undertaking. This research endeavours to deal with the potential trade distorting effects of state trading enterprises. A key feature of this research is that we address the question that the effects of state trading enterprises may be trade distorting, but compared to what? With many academics and policy-makers arguing that world agricultural markets are not perfectly competitive, the impact of state trading enterprises has to be measured relative to a counterfactual that is to varying degrees imperfectly competitive. As such the likely effects of state trading enterprises will depend on what this underlying benchmark is deemed to be. This raises an ancillary question: if agricultural trade is more appropriately characterised as being imperfectly competitive, what are the principal differences between a private monopoly and a monopoly state trading enterprise?
The paper is organised as follows. In section 1, we outline current GATT rules in dealing with state trading. In section 2, we review the incidence of state trading with particular attention to agricultural trade. In section 3, we review the principal concerns that arise with respect to state trading enterprises. In section 4, we highlight some conceptual issues that arise in dealing with the state trading issue while section 5 summarises some preliminary results from recent research we have undertaken. In section 6, we summarise and conclude.
The Status of State Trading Enterprises in the GATT/WTO
(a) GATT Rules. One of the main problems with the GATT Articles in attempting to control the behaviour of state trading enterprises, is that they did not fully clarify what was meant by a 'state trading enterprise'. Early GATT rules referred to state enterprises that had been granted "formally, or in effect, exclusive or special privileges" but also made reference to "any enterprise under the jurisdiction of a contracting party". However, following the Uruguay Round Agreement in 1994, Article XVII was maintained but an attempt was made to define precisely what was meant by a 'state trading enterprise'. Specifically, 'state trading enterprises' were defined as:
Governmental and non-governmental enterprises, including marketing boards, which have been granted exclusive or special rights or privileges, including statutory or constitutional powers, in the exercise of which they influence through their purchases or sales the level or direction of imports or exports. (WTO 1994, p. 25) There are two notable features arising from the current rules regarding state trading enterprises. First of all, it is not ownership per se that matters but the extent to which any organisation has been bestowed exclusive or special rights by the government. Second, it is the nature of these exclusive rights and how the exercise of those exclusive rights impact on trade which is the central concern of the state trading issue. There are six potentially anticompetitive effects that arise from the exercise of such exclusive rights: (i) that, as a consequence, the exclusive rights create a dominant position that may inhibit market access for foreign competitors; (ii) in addition to the monopoly power, exclusive rights may create monopsony power; (iii) that state trading enterprises can discriminate more easily among trading partners; (iv) that, insofar as the exclusive rights create enterprises with 'single desk th EAAE Seminar / NJF Seminar No. 325, August 17-18, 2001 , Helsinki The charging by a state enterprise of different prices for its sale of a product is not precluded by the provisions of this Article, provided that such different prices are charged for commercial reasons, to meet conditions of supply and demand in export markets. (WTO 1994, p. 550, Ad Article XVII:1) In sum, in accordance with current GATT statutes, state trading enterprises are seen as legitimate participants in trade with the existing rules attempting only to constrain their behaviour. The trade concern relates to whether bestowing exclusive rights influences the degree and means of competition such that market access is limited, protection is higher than bound levels and that exporters gain some (perhaps non-transparent) advantages when competing in international markets. Moreover, the insistence of some countries (particularly the United States) to have state trading enterprises on the negotiating agenda presumably reflects the view that current GATT statutes cannot deal adequately with the perceived practices of these enterprises. As well as outlining some general rules regarding the activities of state trading enterprises as they affect trade, there was an attempt made more than forty years ago to enhance transparency regarding the incidence and activities of state traders through a notification procedure. This was a self-reporting exercise whereby GATT signatories had to provide information (due every three years) of state trading enterprises under their jurisdiction. To aid the process, each contracting party had to respond to a questionnaire, developed originally in 1960, which requested information regarding (i) the enumeration of state trading enterprises and the products covered, (ii) the reasons for introducing and maintaining state trading enterprises, (iii) the functions of the enterprise, (iv) provide some statistical information, and (v) if relevant, explain why no foreign trade had taken place.
Despite the best of intentions, this self-reporting procedure was not noted for its success. First of all, the response rate was generally poor. Ingco and Ng (1998) report that, between 1980 and 1994, only 45 countries had submitted notifications with only 3 countries providing notifications for every notification period. Following the 1990 and 1993 requests for notification, a total of only 18 countries had responded and only 5 countries had responded to both requests for information. Of these 18 countries, 3 reported no state trading enterprises in existence. Even then, the reporting procedure was disappointing as, in several cases, the information provided by the respondents was not specific enough to fully ascertain the importance of state trading enterprises. For example, with respect to product coverage, this was not detailed for each specific state trading enterprise. Further, the questions were only selectively answered and the responses were frequently incomplete. However, perhaps the most significant problem with the 1960 questionnaire that contributed to the lack of success of this self-reporting mechanism was that there was clearly some confusion over what constituted a state trading enterprise and what was meant by 'exclusive rights and privileges'.
As discussed above, following the completion of the Uruguay Round in 1994, there was an attempt to provide greater clarity as to what constituted a state trading enterprise. A WTO Working Party on state trading was established and, while the self-reporting principle was maintained, the questionnaire was substantially revised in 1998. Whilst in principle the new questionnaire is similar to its 1960 precursor, the revised version provides more detailed instructions on the information to be provided. Specifically, there is a request for detailed statistical information on import and/or export data by product, for mark-ups for imported products, on the level of domestic procurement/sales by the state trading enterprise and share of domestic procurement/sales as a share of total production/consumption. Furthermore, the revised questionnaire outlined representative organisations and activities that may be covered by the definition of state trading enterprises. These include statutory marketing boards, export marketing boards, regulatory marketing boards, fiscal monopolies, canalizing agencies, foreign trade enterprises and boards or corporations resulting from nationalised industries. In general, the notification procedure has been partially improved with WTO members now taking the self-reporting mechanism more seriously. The number of respondents has increased and the quality of the responses has also improved. Of the 134 members of the WTO (as of 1999), 76 countries had responded to the questionnaire. Of these 76 countries, 33 reported no state trading enterprises in existence, with 43 reporting the existence of one or more state trading enterprises.
That said, however, some problems appear to remain with the notification procedure. In particular, there are still a large number of countries (58) that have yet to respond to the questionnaire and some confusion still exists regarding the interpretation of what constitutes a state trading enterprise. For example, Ackerman and Dixit (1998) note that some countries reported the absence of any state trading enterprise despite the fact that they were known to exist. They cite Egypt's General Authority of Supply Commodities (GASC), Mexico's Compania Nacional de Subsistencias Populares (CONASPUCO) and Pakistan's Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Cooperatives as not having been notified to the WTO. They also cite examples of non-notification from the Central and East European countries. It should be noted that the WTO notification process allows for countries to table written questions or to make counter-notifications when a member country has notified the WTO of the absence of any STE. To some degree, any dispute concerning the existence of a state trading enterprise may be due to alternative interpretations as to what is meant by 'exclusive and special privileges'. For example, in the case of Egypt, since 1993 the government has allowed the private sector to import wheat even though the GASC has remained involved in imports. Ackerman and Dixit (1999) note that, in 1997, the GASC accounted for 60 per cent of Egyptian wheat imports with the remainder being presumably accounted for by the private sector. Consequently, although the state trading enterprise has remained important in importing wheat in Egypt, to what extent it retains 'exclusive' or 'special privileges' is likely to be difficult to determine when it has not been designated 'single buyer' status. This example serves to suggest that further clarification as to what is meant as a 'state trading enterprise' may be necessary. In summary, the new self-reporting procedures have improved the transparency not only of the existence of state trading enterprises but the transparency of their objectives, methods of operation and the trade volumes under their control. Nevertheless, there remain serious ambiguities with respect to the definition of a state trading enterprises and because of this, there remains inconsistency in how members classify such enterprises and ultimately, with whether these entities are covered by Article XVII.
The Incidence of State Trading Enterprises
Despite the recognition in principle about the existence and activities of state trading enterprises in the WTO framework, there is only limited information on the incidence of state trading enterprises in the world economy. A relatively recent UNCTAD report (UNCTAD, 1990) reported the existence of 546 state trading enterprises across 90 developing countries.
Although not specifically related to trade, but indicative about the importance of the state in economic activity, the World Bank reports that the state sector accounts for around 13 per cent of GDP across a wide range of developing economies (World Bank, 1995) . Schmitz (1996) argues that this figure is higher if one focuses on manufacturing GDP, noting that most state intervention in developing countries occurs in this sector. Although privatisation has spread among developing countries, the impression remains that state trading enterprises are likely to be prevalent among developing countries. State trading also exists among developed countries. Although their role in the manufacturing sector is relatively limited, state trading is common in the services sector (e.g. telecommunications, utilities and banking). For example, La Porta et al (2000) have noted the high incidence of government ownership in the banking sector particularly in developing and transition economies. With respect to trade in goods, agriculture is the key sector where the greatest incidence of state trading is to be found. For example, McCalla and Schmitz (1982) note that, in the world grains market, in the late 1970s around 90 per cent of transactions were undertaken where at least one party was characterised by a state trading enterprise. Abbott and Young (1999) suggest that the prevalence of state trading has fallen to between 30-50 per cent due to regulatory reform and the requirements of structural adjustment programmes.
This section focuses more directly on the incidence of state trading in the agriculture sector. In doing so, use is made directly of the recent notifications to the WTO. From this evidence, it is clear why the current debate links state trading strongly with agriculture. A review of the recent notifications by WTO members suggests the existence of more than 150 state trading enterprises. While these cover a broad range of products, around 70 per cent of all notifications relate to state trading enterprises involved in agriculture or related sectors. Although the notification process is incomplete, the information is nevertheless useful with regard to characterising state trading activity. We also comment briefly on the incidence of state trading enterprises involving non-WTO members, in particular China. To obtain a fuller picture on the importance of state trading enterprises, use was made of the WTO notifications to ascertain the relative importance of state trading in a specific market. The world wheat market was chosen given its importance in overall agricultural trade and the coverage of major exporters and importers. In total, 16 state trading enterprises have been notified as being involved in this sector. however, these countries account for only a small proportion of world wheat imports. In addition, China, as the largest importer of wheat on occasion, not being a member of the WTO at this time is not in this list. Second, as noted above, there has been some dispute regarding whether state trading enterprises actually exist even when none are reported. This confusion is due to the definition of state trading enterprises as having 'exclusive rights'. In many importing countries, particularly those in which privatisation has been undertaken, the state trading enterprises co-exist with the private sector. This occurs for example in Egypt, Mexico, Korea and, most recently, in Indonesia. However, this ambiguity leads some countries to report the existence of a state trading enterprise that co-exists with the private sector while others report no state trading activity in line with a strict interpretation of the WTO definition. However, even if all 'mixed' importing markets were counted as state traders, in the context of the world wheat market, state trading activity would appear to be primarily an issue among exporters rather than importers, at least as far as the current membership of the WTO is concerned.
Carrying out the same exercise for other commodities among WTO members would result in a similar picture. For example, with respect to the markets for other cereals, rice, dairy and sugar, the export side of agricultural trade tends to be more concentrated than the import side. Consequently, in terms of attempting to identify However, the picture alters when the issue of non-WTO members is addressed. If China, in particular, is included in the picture, the significance of state trading in import markets increases significantly. China manages its agricultural trade through the China National Cereals, Oil and Foodstuffs Import and Export Corporation (COFCO). China is a large importer of agricultural goods from the world market. In the world wheat market, for example, in 1996 China accounted for 10 per cent (in quantity) of total world imports. In cotton, China accounted for over 10 per cent of world imports and around 16 per cent of world imports for vegetable oils. With the inclusion of China in the data, the role of state trading in import markets becomes much more significant.
There are two further points worthy of note from the WTO notifications. First, in recent years there has been considerable de-regulation of state trading enterprises in several countries. For example, in Japan and Turkey, there has been the privatisation of state monopolies and, as pointed out above, in many countries the private sector is now able to compete with state trading enterprises which previously held a monopoly position. South Africa has gone one step further: it completely de-regulated the state trading sector by dismantling all 11 commodity boards in 1997. Over the last year, there has been considerable debate in Australia about the long-term future of the Australian Wheat Board. Second, WTO members also report the reasons for the existence of the state trading enterprise. Interestingly, the objectives vary considerably: these include, 'income support for domestic producers', 'stability in the market', 'smooth implementation of Uruguay Round commitments', 'best possible return from exports', 'rationalisation of foreign trade enterprises' and 'food security' among others (WTO 1995) . The broad range of aims and objectives suggests that state trading enterprises are very heterogeneous entities such that to assume all state trading enterprises necessarily distort foreign trade and, by extension, that attempts to proscribe their activities without reference to the different objectives and the environments in which they operate, may meet with considerable opposition in many countries.
Overall, the picture one gets from the survey of the WTO notifications (while acknowledging its incomplete nature) is that there are many facets to the state trading issue: it differs from the export, compared to the import, side of the market as exporters tend to be highly concentrated; there has been on-going de-regulation and privatisation; and the reasons for the existence of state trading enterprises can vary widely across WTO members.
Issues Arising from the Activities of State Trading Enterprises
There are essentially two broad issues that arise with respect to state trading enterprises. The first relates to the fulfilment of Uruguay Round obligations and is of particular reference to importing countries. The second, and perhaps of more relevance to exporting countries, relates to the potential anti-competitive impact of the activities of state trading enterprises. We deal with each in turn.
(a) Uruguay Round Commitments and Importing Countries.
Several commentators have linked the state trading issue with the obligations on member countries to fulfil their commitments under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture to reduce levels of support in the agricultural sector (see, for example, Ingco and Ng, op. cit.) . It will be recalled that an element of the outcome of the Uruguay Agreement was to convert all non-tariff barriers into tariff equivalents (which would be bound) and to promote market access via tariff-rate quotas in order to guarantee a (rising) level of market access into importing countries. The use of export subsidies was also disciplined and they were to be reduced over time.
The suspicion against countries with state trading enterprises is that the institutional arrangements can somehow allow them to circumvent their commitments, particularly with regard to import commitments. It is necessary, however, to be specific about the issues in this case. Consider, first of all, that the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture introduced greater transparency into the levels of agricultural support among WTO members. Tariff equivalents are now reported and are bound. Note also that there is increasing transparency arising from WTO members' notifications of state enterprises in that, as discussed above, importing countries have to record the mark-up of domestic prices over import prices for products covered by the state trading enterprise. Thus, at least in principle, it is relatively straightforward to compare whether the level of the mark-up exceeds the bound tariff rate. Therefore, if state trading enterprises are a problem, it relates to their ability to circumvent this two-stranded reporting procedure. For example, this would require them to reduce the mark-up which they report to the WTO under the notification process while still limiting the degree of market access to their markets.
The second suspicion associated with state trading enterprises relates to the management of tariff-rate quotas. This mechanism is an attempt to ensure a certain level of market access to importing country markets. In many countries, this occurs through some sort of licensing scheme. However, in other countries, the tariff-rate quota is only managed by a state trading enterprise, i.e. state trading enterprises do not have direct responsibility for imports but rather issue licences to private traders. Indeed, some countries (e.g. the Philippines) have established state trading enterprises with the sole purpose of managing the import arrangements agreed through the Uruguay Round. The suspicion arises that the rate of quota utilisation (or fill rates) will be influenced by the existence of state trading enterprises and hence market access will be limited and the Uruguay Round commitments will not be fulfilled. However, whether the rate of quota utilisation will be less with a state trading enterprise compared to an alternative licensing scheme is debatable since import licensing does not guarantee a higher rate of quota fill. For example, import licences can be auctioned or allocated to importing or exporting firms by given criteria (e.g. first-come, first served or historical status as importer and so on, and allocated by broad commodity group or by specific product and specific country) with the extent of competition in the licence market determining the rate of quota fill. There is no a priori reason why the institutional arrangements are more important than the allocative mechanism or that state trading enterprises should, on their own, result in a lower rate of quota utilisation. The WTO has identified ten methods of allocation of tariff-rate quotas, each of which has generated different fill rates. Recent evidence from the WTO shows that the tariff quota fill rate with state trading enterprises is one of the highest. The data is shown in Figure 3 . For 1999, the fill rate for countries using state trading enterprises was 100 per cent. Taking the 1995-1999 period as a whole, managing tariff quotas via state trading enterprises has consistently shown the highest fill rate. However, auctioning, arguably the most preferable way to distribute quota licences from an economist's view, has consistently had the lowest fill rate over this period with only 24 per cent quota fill in 1999. On the whole, the experience thus far with the 36 countries and well over 1000 tariff-rate quotas is that, on average, the quotas are not being filled. However, it should not be inferred necessarily that there is an excess of protectionism. The reasons for the incomplete fill are complex and vary from case to case. For example, the within-quota tariff may have been too high or the quota too generous or the method of allocation inadequate. However, the presumption that state trading will result in a lower level of quota fill is not supported by the data.
(b) Anti-Competitive Behaviour of Exporting Countries
With regard to exporting countries, the concern appears to be that countries that manage their exports through state trading exporters can distort trade and, as a consequence, give them an 'unfair' share of world markets. In this regard, the on-going criticism by the United States of the activities of the Canadian Wheat Board and the Australian Wheat Board typifies the concerns relating to export countries that use state trading enterprises. Of particular concern is the single desk nature of state trading enterprises' 'exclusive rights and privileges'. Table 4 summarises some features of state trading activities of the Canadian Wheat Board and the Australian Wheat Board, features which can (it is hypothesised) influence the behaviour of these state trading enterprises in the world wheat market. There are several issues that arise from the above characterisation. First, given that both Wheat Boards control both export and (most of) domestic sales (they have 'single-desk' status), they have the potential to price discriminate (or cross-subsidise sales) between domestic and foreign markets. While price discrimination by state trading enterprises is legitimate under GATT Article XVII:1(b), the concern raised by the United States is that these Wheat Boards, due to the means by which they are empowered to control the domestic market, have an ability to price discriminate on world markets that is not available to private traders.
Related to price discrimination, is the potential for price pooling. In broad terms, price pooling involves paying producers an average price from sales in all markets. However, the practice of price pooling may be more subtle. Specifically, in the case of the Canadian Wheat Board, producers receive an advance payment that is equivalent to 80 per cent of the projected final price. Additional payments are made to producers at a later date when the total supply of the commodity has been marketed. N.B. The information relates to wheat only. In both cases, the boards are responsible for a wider range of commodities. For example, the Canadian Wheat Board has an export monopoly on barley exports while the AWB (Australia) Ltd which is part of AWB Ltd can trade in other grains internationally. Source: Ackerman (1997b) .
If, as expected, the projected price is realised, then further payments are paid to producers. However, the initial pool payments are guaranteed by the Canadian government such that, if the pooled price is below the initial price paid to producers, it will underwrite the Wheat Board's losses. Clearly, as the United States has again argued, this gives an advantage to Canadian exporters that would not be available if the exports were undertaken by the private sector. (Note, however, that since 1989 the Australian government has not underwritten the guaranteed minimum producer price although, until June 1999, it did underwrite the losses of its Wheat Board). Moreover, given that the Canadian government under-writes the activities of the Canadian Wheat Board, loans to it are perceived as lower risk and are hence less costly. Carter and Loyns (1996) have estimated that these benefits are worth around Cn $60 million annually. Finally note that neither country uses export subsidies as policy instruments. However, the criticism of these state trading exporters appears to be that the hidden benefits due to their ties with the central government (for example, through the use of export guarantees) and/or its single desk status whereby they can control both domestic and foreign sales, can have an effect equivalent to the use of explicit export subsidies 2 .
Analysing the State Trading Issue: Some Conceptual Issues
Taking the concerns relating to market access and export competition together, the general concern with state trading enterprises appears to be that they represent a barrier to trade in importing countries and a means of unfair trade in export markets that cannot be dealt with in the same way as traditional trade policy instruments. As such, even if further trade liberalisation could be agreed in the context of the forthcoming WTO negotiations, market access and export competition will still be hindered by the presence of state trading enterprises. Consequently, despite current GATT Articles on state trading, further negotiations on state trading are required to limit their consequences for non-state trading countries. Over the last year or so, we have initiated a research programme that attempts to shed some light on some of these issues. We give an indication of the progress we have made in some of this research in the following section where we ask if state trading enterprises are likely to hinder the outcomes of the trade reform process. In this section, we start with discussing some conceptual issues that has under-pinned our modelling framework.
(a) What is the Counterfactual?
The underlying premise appears to be that state trading enterprises are monopoly traders that compete in an otherwise competitive world market. This perception is particularly true of single desk state trading enterprises that have monopsony status with regard to domestic procurement and imports and monopoly status over the sale of products in both domestic and export markets. Apart from the specific details of the links between state trading enterprises and government, the nature of these exclusive rights and privileges gives them, it is argued, an unfair advantage in competing with countries that do not rely on state trading. However, the presumption that agricultural markets can be characterised as being competitive has been disputed by both academics and stakeholders in the negotiating process.
Take the former first of all. It has long been argued that world agricultural markets may be more appropriately characterised as being imperfectly competitive. To list just a few examples, McCalla (1966) , Kolstad and Burris (1986) , Patterson and Abbott (1994) among many others, at the very least, cast doubt on the assumption that markets are perfectly competitive. In terms of domestic markets, there is a wide body of research that suggests that the food industry in developed countries is imperfectly competitive. With regard to stakeholders in the policy-reform process they too have raised the issue of competitiveness of markets. For example, Paddock (1998) and Veeman et al. (1999) have raised this issue with respect to the environment in which the Canadian Wheat Board competes. More recently, in a paper for the South Centre (an intergovernmental organisation representing the interests of developing countries), Murphy (1999) has also raised this issue arguing that world agricultural trade is dominated by a few large multinationals. The implication of these views is that: (a) state trading enterprises may act to countervail the impact of an otherwise imperfectly competitive market; and (b) if state trading enterprises are a legitimate focus for trade negotiators so too is the issue of competition among (a small number) of private firms more generally.
Without necessarily taking a view on any of these perspectives of world agricultural trade, the challenge for the researcher is to consider the impact of state trading enterprises when domestic and world markets can be characterised as being either perfectly or imperfectly competitive. Hence the important issue to determine is the marginal effect of the presence of state trading enterprises where the marginal effect is determined by the specification of the underlying benchmark.
(b) What is Different about State Trading Enterprises?
Suppose we take as an essential part of our counterfactual that markets are imperfectly competitive and consider, first of all, consider the export case. Let us further assume that we have two countries competing in a world market and that each firm can also sell the goods domestically. Domestic and world markets are assumed to be segmented. In this case, we have essentially the Brander and Krugman model of 'reciprocal dumping' (Brander and Krugman, 1983 ) the main difference being that they are not selling in each other's market such that intra-industry trade does not arise. In this case, each firm price discriminates between the domestic and world market, charging a higher price at home and a lower price in world markets given that the perceived marginal revenue function in world markets is flatter than the domestic marginal revenue curve. Would this be an appropriate characterisation of a state trading world where each firm has monopoly and monopsony power in domestic markets and with respect to export sales?
The answer is yes and no. The 'yes' arises from the fact that we have monopoly status in each country. If the market otherwise was characterised by a larger number of firms, then by proffering 'special rights and privileges' to one of these firms we have created a state trading enterprise (remember that it is not ownership that matters but the exclusivity of the rights and privileges). As such, part of the potential impact of a state trading enterprise is the anticompetitive effect of reducing competition in each market, the impact of the state trading enterprise being the impact of reducing competition. But there is also the 'no' part to the answer. In the above framework, as in most trade models that have imperfect competition, each firm is assumed to maximise profits. This is arguably an unrealistic assumption when we consider state trading enterprises. State trading enterprises usually exist as part of a country's agricultural policy that, at least in developed countries, is heavily biased in favour of producers. Assuming private firms to maximise their own profits irrespective of the interests of the producers it buys from is unrealistic.
In our recent work, we have taken essentially the Brander-Krugman characterisation as spelled out above but assumed the state trading enterprise to maximise total producer surplus from sales in both domestic and export markets. In this sense, it conforms with the characteristics of Baldwin's 'politically-realistic' welfare function (Baldwin, 1987) . Consequently, the model is more firmly in the context of a mixed oligopoly with state trading enterprises either trading against a private firm, the main difference being the nature of their objective functions. The nature of this market equilibrium is now different from the private firm case which had monopoly rights but which maximised profits, with the surplus maximising state trading enterprise now capturing a higher share of the world market. As such, compared to the private firm case, the surplus maximising state trading enterprise represents a trade distortion. A more explicit characterisation of this framework can be found in McCorriston and MacLaren, 2000) .
These ideas carry over to the import case. In characterising the benchmark, we have domestic firms that compete with foreign firms in the home market. In considering the impact of a state trading enterprise, the single desk state trading enterprise represents a fall in the number of competitors and a change in the outcome due to the state trading enterprise maximising producer surplus and the rent from imports rather than simply maximising its own profits. As is shown in McCorriston and MacLaren (2001a) , this specification reduces imports beyond the level that would arise in the private firm case and hence can be interpreted as an equivalent barrier to trade. In both the export and import cases, we derive the subsidy and tariff equivalent distortions due to state trading enterprises when the underlying benchmark is flexible i.e. when the market is, to varying degrees, perfectly or imperfectly competitive.
(c) Further Considerations
The above discussion gives an idea of how we deal with the question of the impact of state trading enterprises when the underlying benchmark can vary and where a state trading enterprise is different from a private firm due to the characterisation of its payoff function. Of course, other things matter too. For example, state trading enterprises come in a variety of forms. With single desk status being only one characterisation, albeit the one that seems to be the primary focus of trade negotiators. Nevertheless, 'special rights and privileges' can be arise say in the form of licensed firms or designated traders which can still distort the level of trade. Furthermore, the environment in which state trading enterprises compete is also an important determinant of the effect of state trading enterprises. For example, do governments use domestic price support, tariffs and export subsidies as well as state trading to influence markets and the level of trade? These factors are discussed in MacLaren (2000, 2001a) where they show that the marginal effect of state trading on world trade is highly dependent on these underlying characteristics of the domestic and world markets as well as the level of competition in the benchmark case.
Trade Reform with State Trading Enterprises
If the concerns that state trading enterprises distort trade (particularly those of a single desk nature) are substantiated, then this gives rise to second issue. If the trade negotiations deal with market access issues in the form of tariff levels and tariff-rate quotas, market access will still be inhibited by the presence of state trading enterprises in importing countries that employ them. Similarly, in terms of disciplining the use of export subsidies, even if these can be negotiated successfully, unless the state trading issue is formally dealt with, unfair competition on export markets will persist. Taken together, the gains from trade reform will be limited by the presence of state trading enterprises or, at the very least, the distribution of the gains and losses will be asymmetric between those countries that use state trading enterprises and those that do not.
We report briefly on two papers in progress that address this issue MacLaren 2001b, 2001c) . The underlying specification is the same as that outlined above: the underlying benchmark captures varying degrees of imperfect competition; state trading enterprises can have single desk status and state trading enterprises differ from private firms due the nature of their payoff function. We summarise some results for the exporter and importer case respectively focussing on export competition and market access issues.
(a) Trade Reform in the Export Country Case
In the underlying benchmark, we have a variant of the Brander-Krugman model with two countries competing in the world market. In terms of market structure, we have a fairly competitive case with 20 firms in each country. Each firm can sell in both the domestic and export market. One of these countries (the foreign country), uses an export subsidy such that, although the underlying market is symmetric, it captures a higher share of the world market due to the use of this subsidy. If this subsidy is reduced by say 50 per cent, world trade increases, with the non-subsidy using country capturing more of the world market at the expense of the subsidy using country. These effects are what one would expect.
Suppose we make this benchmark different (say 10 firms in each country) in only one respect; the initial number of firms. What would we expect? In terms of the direction of the effects nothing, but the quantitative impact will be different. It is well known from the general economics literature that the effects of exogenous changes in say the form of tariffs, exchange rates or taxes are different when markets are less than perfectly competitive. This is due to the transmission of policy changes being typically less when markets are imperfectly competitive (see, for example, Goldberg and Knetter, 1997 for a summary of some of this research in international economics).
Now suppose that the non-subsidising country uses a single desk state trading enterprise. When the subsidising country reduces its export subsidies the impact is qualitatively the same, but the quantitative impact is considerably different. The effects on the market shares of the foreign (export subsidy reducing) country are captured in Figure 1 . In the more competitive case (n=m=20), exports fall as a result of the reduction in the export subsidy (see first bar). In the less competitive case, exports fall but by a lower extent (see third bar). However, relative to both these characterisations of the underlying benchmark, if the subsidy reducing country reduced its export subsidies while the competing country uses a state trading enterprise, the change in its exports would be even greater. The mirror image of this is seen for the home country that employs no export subsidies but uses a state trading enterprise to manage exports ( Figure 2 ). Exports increase in the two underlying benchmarks but in the state trading case exports increase by comparatively less. What interpretations can be put on this? There are two that initially come to mind. First, state trading enterprises change the underlying market equilibrium such that the market shares are not symmetric in the absence of the other country using export subsidies. Although exports increase for the state trading using country, because the presence of the state trading enterprise already gave it a higher than expected share of export markets, the marginal effect of the other country lowering its export subsidies is comparatively less. A second interpretation of these figures is one that essentially justifies the EU position. Export subsidies, in effect if not intention, countervail the impact of state trading enterprises such that the impact on the subsidy reforming country is exacerbated (Figure 1 ) if state trading is not dealt with at the same time.
(b) Trade Reform in the Import Country Case
In the importing country case, we again vary the benchmark. The scenario here is one where the government uses tariffs and a single desk state trading enterprise to manage its imports. In the trade reform scenario, imports are reduced by 50 per cent but the state trading enterprise remains in place. The outcome in terms of market access is reported in Figure 3 .
As expected, reducing tariffs increases imports. This increase in imports is greater in the more competitive benchmark case (compare the first with the second bar). In the state trading enterprise case, the increase in imports is comparatively less. The obvious interpretation to put on this Figure is that improving market access will be hindered by the presence of state trading enterprises. As such, it can be argued that state trading enterprises are a legitimate subject for negotiation. 
Summary and Conclusions
The purpose of this paper has been two-fold. First of all, to put the current focus on state trading in some context by discussing rules that currently exist to influence the behaviour of state trading enterprises and the WTO treatment of them to enhance transparency, the incidence of state trading enterprises that arise in agricultural trade and a summary of the principle concerns relating to the state trading issue. The second purpose has been to summarise recent research efforts we have been undertaking to address these emerging issues taking into account academic research and concerns of some stakeholders that agricultural markets are more appropriately characterised as being imperfectly competitive.
Given that some countries, in their recent submissions to the WTO, have put state trading enterprises on their negotiating agendas, we can ask are they right to do so? The discussions in sections 4 and 5 would confirm that they are. State trading enterprises do distort trade though the extent of this distortion will depend on a number of factors including the specification of the underlying benchmark. As such, export competition is influenced by single desk state trading enterprises and state trading enterprises hinder market access into importing countries is limited. Taken together, if the WTO agenda reduces traditional trade policy instruments, the gains from trade reform will be limited and potentially asymmetric if the impact of state trading enterprises remains unchallenged.
As always, the story may not be as simple as this. There are two further concerns. First, state trading enterprises come in a variety of forms not just those with single desk status. As such, the impact on trade and the effect of state trading enterprises will vary according to the precise specification of the rights and privileges the state trading enterprise has. Second, state trading enterprises exist for a number of reasons. While part of this is domestic support, in some cases, state trading enterprises have wider aims including market stabilisation and food security. How market structure and state trading effects risk and food security issues, and the specific forms it may take, are a current focus in our research agenda.
